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ABSTRACT 
Recently two game theoretic interpretations of social 
procedures have been offered. First, Wilson [1970] and Plotlt, 
suggested that, for each environment, the value of a choice lfu 
might constitute a nsolutionn or stable set that could arise f 
play of some underlying cooperative game. In this view an Jmp 
problem is to determine if and under what conditions a givel s 
concept (or notion of stability) can, for some game, characJer 
behavior of a given social choice function. 
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Secondly, social choice functions have been interp:te ed as' 
collections of equilibria of an underlying noncooperative gL (sej 
Gibbard [1973], Peleg [1978], Maskin [1977], and Ferejohn ahd Gret� 
[1979]). In this framework, one major problem is to determln for I 
given equilibri� oormpond�e of a auitably ohoa® nonjp raei�
I game. A closely related problem is to determine which noncbq eratfl
games possess nonempty equilibrium correspondences of vario1ls sorJ 
In this paper we pursue a cooperative game-theoreoic 
interpretation of social choice. And, in particular, we sJowl that a
social choice function arises as a Von Neumann Morgenstern tso utioDllll ILn 
each environment then it is essentially oligarchical in exact 
same sense that ncoren selecting choice functions are oliglrc 
conditions under which this conclusion is obtained are, in l fal 
more restrictive than those for the results on core selectin 
functions but are still weak enough that our result applier 
any commonly occurring voting rule. 
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VON NEUMANN MORGENSTERN SOLUTION SOCIAL CHOICE FUNCTIONS: 
AN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM 
John A. Ferejohn and Richard D. McKelvey 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Historically, social decision rules have been given three 
distinct interpretations, one of which is basically normative 
and the others of which are positive. In the classical formulation 
of the problem of social choice by Bergson [1938] and Arrow [1963], 
a social welfare function is supposed to embody a collection of 
judgments about society's welfare. And, for a given configuration 
of individual preferences (or environment) , and available technologies 
(or feasible set) , the maximal elements of the welfare function describe 
the "best" courses of action open to society. On this view a principal 
problem of social choice theory is to determine if various collections 
of ethical intuitions about social welfare are consistent in the sense 
that allows these intuitions to be represented by a function which can 
then be maximized by the choice of appropriate values of the decision 
variables available to a hypothetical planner. 
More recently two game theoretic interpretations of social 
choice procedures have been offered. First, Wilson [1970] and Plott, 
[1974] suggested that, for each environment, the value of a choice 
function might constitute a "solution" or stable set that could arise 
from the play of some underlying cooperative game. In thislvilew a 
important problem is to determine if and under what conditions! a 
solution concept (or notion of stability) can, for some gaml,
the behavior of a given social choice function. For exampll ,
that if for any collection of preferences a nonempty-valuedls 
function always chooses the core of a set of alternatives, h
underlying game must exhibit a nearly oligarchical charactel
1975]. In particular there are certain individuals who mush
:char 
it i 
of every "decisive" or "winning" coalition. 
Secondly and more recently, social choice functionsl have b 
interpreted as collections of equilibria of an underlying �ontoop 
game (see Gibbard (1973], Peleg [1978], Maskin [1977], and iFetejoh 
and Grether [1979]) . In this framework, one major problem lislto 
determine for a given equilibirum concept, which social chlic 
can be generated as the equilibrium correspondence of a suita 
noncooperative game. For example, the Gibbard-SatterthwaiJe. 
asserts that if for each environment the social choice funJti 
as a (nonempty) set of outcomes each of which can be suppojte 
fu 
ly 
heo 
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by 
dominant strategy equilibrium of some game, then that gamelmust be 
dictatorial. A closely related problem is to determine which 
· ·1·b · I d noncooperative games possess nonempty equi i rium correspon ehces 
various sorts. 
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While the previous literature has made significant I ptjogres!Sllllin 
characterizing 
noncooperative 
those social choice functions that can be gen 
·1·b · d 1. 1 .I equi i rium correspon ences, itt e attention 
given to the properties of those choice processes that canla 
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cooperative play. Indeed,. given the diversity of cooperative solutions 
to games one might suspect that such a wide variety of choice functions 
would be consistant with some "solution" of a cooperative game, that 
almost no restrictions are put on the game by the assumption that the 
choice process is a solution. While this question has not been 
addressed in earlier published literature, Plott [1974] posed it in 
the special case in which the choice process is also assumed to be 
"rational. " He found that if a social choice function is rational and 
is a "solution" to some cooperative game, then the dominance relation 
of the game must be quasitransitive. And, in the context of a universal 
domain condition, this implies that the social choice function is 
oligarchical. But the restriction to rational social choice functions 
to be very strong since it implies the existence of a nonempty 
core which, by itself, forces the game to be nearly oligarchical and 
so, we focus instead on a much larger class of (possibly nonrational) 
functions. 
Thus in this paper we pursue a cooperative game-theoretic 
interpretation of social choice. And, in particular, we show that 
if a social choice function arises as a Von Neumann Morgenstern 
solution in each environment then it is essentially oligarchical in 
exactly the same sense that "core" selecting choice functions are 
oligarchic. Or to put things another way, a nonempty Von Neumann 
Morgenstern solution correspondence is well defined only for games 
with nearly oligarchic structures. The conditions under which this 
conclusion is obtained are, in fact, slightly more restrictive than 
those for the results on core selecting choice functions 
weak enough that our result applies to almost any commonly 
voting rule. And, it should be noted that the methods of 
utilized to obtain these results are quite different from 
those found in the earlier literature. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION 
We let N = {1, 2, • • .  ,n} be a finite collection 
and X be a set of alternatives. Let]!:_ = a::' (X) - � 
of nonempty subsets of X, and].�]!:_ be any subset
I 
Let 0 be the set of binary relations on X, e0 be the set of
4 
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on X, and e = II 8. , where e . 
- i=l l. l. 
I e0 for all i e: N. A social ·r----::�rnl 
function is any function C 
S e: B and R e: 8. 
! x Q + ]!:_ satisfying
Given a profile !_ e: Q., an n person cooperative
be represented by an asymmetric binary relation D(!_) E 
refer to as a dominance relation. To say that xD(!_) y, 
means that there is some coalition (set) of individuals 
strictly prefer x to y and who are also effective for x 
the sense that they have the power, under the rules, to 
a change from x to y, should they choose to do so. 
dominance relations generated by a given game, as nreferen�e� 
is then described by a function D : §!_ + 8 which assigns,
can 
ch wf 
y E: 
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profile ! E Q, an asymmetric binary relation D(!) E 8. Any such 
function is called a dominance structure. 
Two solutions for cooperative games are well known: the 
5 
core and the Von Neumann Morgenstern solution. Formally, given a set 
S E ]., a core of the game described by D(!) is any subset K(S, !) of 
S satisfying 
K(S, !) { x E Sl'V yD(!)x for all y E S} .
A Von Neumann Morgenstern Solution is any subset V(S, !) of S satisfying 
(i) Vx, y  E S, "'xD(!) Y
(ii) Vx E S - V(S, !) , 3y E V(S, !) s.t. yD(!) x. 
In this paper, we consider conditions under which the 
choice function C can be expressed as the solution of some underlying 
n person cooperative game. To do this, we use some definitions 
originally studied by Wilson [1970], which connect the social choice 
and game theoretic formulations: 
Definition 1: A social choice function C : B x 8 + X satisfies the
core property iff there is a dominance structure D : 8 + 8 such that 
for all R E 8 and all x E S E ]_, x E C(S, !) � 'V yD(!) x for all
Y E S.
Definition 2: A social choice function C : B x 8 + X satisf�es t 
solution property iff there is a dominance s�ruc�ur: D : �J +le SU•· 
that for all ! E Q, and all x E S E ]_, x E C(S, !) '*"*' "' yn :<B:�x fo 
y E C(S, !) .
It is easily verified that the solution property! i equ
to requiring that for all S E B and R E 8, C(S, R) selects a . on N- - - -  
Morgenstern solution from S according to the dominance relat:lon 
D(!) . We first note an elementary consequence of definit�onlone: 
Proposition 1 If C : B x 8 + X is a social choice function! wit- - -
I ]_ = _! =(j'(X) - $, then if C satisfies the core property, p(RI} is 
acyclic for all R E 8.
Proof: Assume D(!) is not acyclic for some ! E �· Then thete i
set S = {x1, ... , xk} with x�_1D(�x�(mod k) for all �. It ! follows 
I 
the definition of the core property that C(S, !) = $, a contradict• 
Q.E.1u, 
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In this paper, we restrict our attention to games satisfying 
certain desirabl e properties. For any!= (R1, ... ,Rn) E <2_, we l et 
P = (P:L' . . •  -,Pn), where Pi is the asymmetr
ic part of Ri for each 
i E N. Then the first condition we impose is a monotonicity 
requirement: 
Condition 1 A dominance structure D : 0 + 0 is monotonic iff 
* * * (Vx,y E X)(V!,_! E Q}[(Vi E N)(xRiy =l> xRiy and xPiy � xPiy) � 
(xD�)y =l> xD�*)y)] 
Thus, if we move from profil e _!  to R* and find that everyone's 
ranking of x vis a vis y is at l east as good in !* as it was in !• then 
if x al ready dominated y under _!, it must stil l dominate it under 
R*. Next, for any ordered k-tupl es (x1, ... ,xk) and (yl , . • •  ,yk) 
* . I = R*I in XxXx • • •  xX, for any!•! E S2_, we write! (x1, . . . ,�) - - (y1, ... ,yk) 
iff, for al l 1 � i, j � k, and al l p EN 
x.R x. *""' y.R* y. i p J i p J 
Now, we have the fol l owing definitions of neutral ity and independence 
Condition 2 A dominance structure D : � + 8 is neutral iff, for al l
R E  8, and x,y,z,w E X,RI ( ) ;;; RI ( ) =l> D(R)I ( ) ;;; D(R)I( ). - - - x,y - z,w - x,y - z,w 
Condition 3 A dominance structure D : � + 8 satisfies 
of Irrel evant Al ternatives (IIA) iff, for al l B:_,B:_* E �. 
!I (x,y) ;;; !*I (x,y) =l> D(,!) I (x,y) ;;; D(�'�>lcx,y)• 
Note that monotonicity impl ies independence of irrel evant 
Now if D is a dominance structure then for any 
a cycl e for D �) is any set S {x1, ... ,xk} E ! 
xt_1D(B:_)xt (mod k) for al l 1 � t � k. If �R is the set 
cycl es for D (,!) and � R # cji, then set 
Any cycl e S for which Isl 
�=min Isl 
S E� 
� is cal l ed a minimal cycl e 
Now if � R # cp for some _! E �. set 
k=min� 
Rs8 
�R#cji 
If! E � and S E! are such that S is a cycl e for D(_!), 
then S is cal l ed a minimal cycl e for D. The integer 
the minimal cycl e size for D. Note that if D has no 
size (i.e., �R cp for al l _!  E �), then D(!) is acycl ic
R E 8. 
erna es. 
n R 
(R). 
11 
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3. VON NEUMANN MORGENSTERN CHOICE FUNCTIONS AND DOMINANCE STRUCTURES 
In this section we establ ish that any choice function that 
satisfies the sol ution property must be generated by an impl icit 
dominance structure which is acycl ic. More precisel y we pbtain the 
fol l owing resul t: 
Theorem 1 Let C : X x 8 -;. X be a social choice function satisfying 
the sol ution property, and l et D 8 + 8 be a corresponding dominance 
structure. Then if Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied, then either 
D(�) is acycl ic for al l !_  E �. or !xi is even with the minimal cycl e 
size for D equal to jxj. 
Proof: The proof uses a series of Lemmas which fol l ow. Actual l y, onl y 
Lemmas 1 and 5 are used directl y in the theorem. Lemmas 2,3, and 4 
are used to prove Lemma 5. Assume the conditions of the theorem hol d 
and that D(!_) is not acycl ic for al l R E 8. Then D has a minimal 
cycl e size, say k. But if k is odd, there is some !_ E � for which 
D(!_) has a minimal cycl e of size k, which by Lemma 1, is impossibl e. 
So k must be even, with k � 4, since there cannot be cycl es of size 2. 
Now, Lemmas 1-4 show that if k < jxj it is possibl e to construct 
a profil e !* for which D(!*) has minimal cycl e size k + 1. The resul t 
now fol l ows from Lemma 1, since now for!_*, the sol ution property 
cannot be satisfied. 
Q.E.D. 
Lemma 1 Let C : 1!'._ x §. + 1!'._ be a social choice function satisfying 
the sol ution property. Let D : §. + 8 be a corresponding dominance 
structure, and l et R E 8. Then D(!_) cannot have minimal 
size k where k is odd. 
Proof: Let S = {x1, ... ,xk} be a minimal cycl e for D(B)· 
xt_1D(!_)xt(mod k) for al l t, and for al l other x,y E 
Now l et xi E C(S,!_) for some 1 _:':. i _:':. k. Then xi+l 
But now since xi+l is the onl y el ement in S 
it fol l ows that xi+2 E C(S,!_)(mod k). Thus 
{x1,x3, ... ,�} or to {x2,x4, ... �_1} which is a 
For the next l emmas, we introduce some additional notation·. 
be such that D(!_) yiel ds a minimal cycl e of size k, say 
such that 
xt-l D(!_)xt 
for al l 1 _:':. t < k(mod k). For each 1 _:':. j _:':. k, set 
and set 
d. (R) 
J -
do(!) 
{i E Njxt-l Pixt for al l t * 
{i E N!x0I.x. for al l 1 < t,p < ivl.p - -
0 
k) 
k), 
t R 
ll 
Then we have the following result. 
Lemma 2 Let C be monotonic and satisfy the solution property, 
further assume that the dominance structure D has a minimal cycle 
{xl' ... , xk} .  Then i f  x.P x. 1 for some 
p EN and some 1 < j < k(mod k) ,
J p J- - -
then if R* E 8 satisfies i) R *Jl R0 for Jl # i, and ii) p E d.(R
*) ,
� J -
then D(!_*) also generates a minimal cycle on {x1, ... , xk} .
Proof: Let !_ and !.* be as described. Then it follows that for
all 1 2. Jl 2. k, and all q EN,
XJl-lPqxJl � XJl-lP; xJl
* XJl-lRqXJl =*° XJl-lRq XJl
(mod k)}
(*) 
(mod k) 
This is immediate if q # p, since here R' = R'. If q = p, then for q p 
Jl # j, (*) holds since here xJl_1P;xJl. For q = p and Jl = j, (*) holds
since xJlPpxJl_1. But now from monotonicity of C, since xJl_1D(!_) xJl for
all Jl(mod k) , it follows from (*) that xJl_1D(!_
*) xJl for all Jl(mod k) .
Thus the set {x1, ... , xk} forms a cycle under D(!_
*) of length k, which
by assumption must be of minimal length. 
Q.E.D. 
Lennna 3 If C satisfies the solution property and its 
D has a minimal cycle of size k, and if C is monotonic, 
domitlartce s 
then tlhere 
an R* E 8 such that D(g,_*) contains a minimal cycle such that 
k 
U d. (R*) = N.
j=O J -
Proof: Let !_ be a profile yielding the minimal cycle {x1, + · l xk} 
satisfying xJl_1D(!_) xJl for all 1 2. Jl < k(mod k) . Let
k 
d* (!_) N - U d. (R) 
j=O J -
Now let K = ld*(R) I. Then if K = O ,  set R* = R, and we are - - -  If Kt 0, then pick p E d*(R) . Since p ¢ d (R) , it follows
transitivity of R that the�e is some j sue: �hat x.P x. 11(m p J p J-
By Lemma 2, it now follows that the profile R* defined in Le 
satisfies d* (R>'<) = N - � d. (R*) = K - 1. Th: result now fbJJ-
j=O J -
immediately by induction on K. 
a 2 
ows 
Q;.IE.D. 
Lemma 4 Assume C satisfies the solution property that 
structure D has a minimal cycle length k, and that C is 
and neutral. Then if _g_ E � and D (�) contains a minimal
and 
k 
U d.(!_) = N, then d.(R) #�for all 1 < j < k.
j=O J J - -
2 
cture 
e 
Proof: Let {x1, ... ,xk} be a minimal
 cycle for D which is attained 
by ! E �· I.e., xt_1D(!) xt for all t(mod k) . Now suppose d.(R)J -
for some 1 _:=: j < k. Then it follows that for all i E N,
and 
x.I.x.+l � i E d (R) � x.I.x.+2 for all j (mod k) J l. J  o - J l. J 
xj-lPixj �xj-ZPixj (mod k)
k 
But then, since U d.(R) = N, the above two situations exhaust the 
j=O J -
13 
<P 
possible cases. Hence R I ; R I . - (xj-l'xj) - (xj-Z'xj) By neutrality, it 
follows that x. 2D(R) x., since x. 1D(R) x . •  But then {x1, • . •  ,x.. } 
- {x.}
J- - J J- - J lC J 
has a cycle of size k - 1, which contradicts the minimality of k. 
Hence d.(R) t- cp. 
J -
Q.E. D. 
Lemma 5 Let C satisfy the solution property and assume that its 
dominance structure has minimal cycle length k 2:_ 4 where if X is
finite Ix! > k. Assume C is monotonic and neutral. Then there is
an R* E 0 such that D(!*) contains a minimal cycle of length 
k + 1. 
Proof: By lemmas 3 and 4, it follows that there is a prof 
R E 0 such that D(!) contains a minimal cycle of length k, Isa 
{x1, .. . ,xk} = B, and such that R satisfies.
i) 
ii) 
k 
U d. (R) 
j=O J -
N 
d.(R) t- <P for 1 < j < kJ - -
Nm; we pick x* E X - {xl' ... , xk} ,  and we define the new pr<hfiJle 
R* E 0 as follows for any x,y E X, and p EN,
then 
xI*yp 
* xPpy
if x,y E X - {x1, ... ,xk,x*} .
if x E {x1, • . .  ,xk,x*}
and y E X  - {x1, • • •  ,xk,x*} .
xR;y � xRpy if [x,y E {x1, . • .  ,xk} and p ¢ dk.Ll 
I 
or [{x,y} t- {x1,xk} ]
xP;y - yP px if {x,y} = {x1,xk} and p E dk-l q !) 
4 
* * xkPpx if p E d (R)1 -
* * x pp xk-1
if p E dk-l (�) 
x*r;� if p E d0(,!9 
and 
.. } 
xkPpx 
otherwise 
*p'
� x pxl 
Now on {x1, . • .  ,�}, we have, for {x,y} # {�,x1},
Hence for R, # 1 (mod k) , 
Further, i� follows that 
R*I =RI - (x,y) - - (x,y)
XR.-lD(B:_
*) xR,
* 
'V xkD(!_ ) x1
To see this, note that if �D(B:_
*) x1, then D(!_
*) generates a minimal
cycle on {x1, . • .  ,xk}. But dk_1(B,.
*) =$, and for all p Ed*(!*)
15 
k 
= N - U d.(B:_*) ,  we have, by construction, that x1P xk. Hehc<t, 
j=O J 
p I : 
applying Lemma 2, we can construct a third profile, R** E 0 l for 
which D(B:_**) also has a minimal cycle in {x1, • • •  ,�} such (hat 
k 
U d
J
.(!**) = N, but where dk_1<!
**)
j=O 
$. This contradicts! iemma 
so we must have � xkD(!_*) x1, as claimed. Now, by construc�i@n it 
follows that. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
* I * ) ! (x ,xl 
!*j (xk,x*) 
*1 * ) R (x ,xk-1 
* I * ! (x ,x2)
= 
R I )- - (xk,xl 
;;; !I c�-2,xk-1)
(xk,�-2)
;; ! I (xk,x2)
Thus, by neutrality, we get 
* 
x D(!*) x1
xkD(B:_
*) x*· 
* * * *"' x D(!_ ) xk-l and "' xk_1
D(!_ ) x  
. * . * "' x D(B:_*) x2 and "' xkD(!_ ) x2 
16 
Thus {x1, ... xk, x
*} form a cycle of size k + 1. Further this is a
minimal cycle in DCB:*) by construction.
Q.E.D. 
4. DISCUSSION 
17 
That a social choice function arises either as a solution 
or a core to a neutral and monotone cooperative game evidently requires 
that game to possess a rather well-behaved dominance structure in the 
following sense. First, we know that the dominance structure must 
satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives and be acyclic 
valued. Further, if for some S E !. and Be E �. C(S, B:) f S, then
Arrow's Pareto Principle (PP) must be satisfied too. 
Proposition 2: If C satisfies the solution property (or the core property) 
relative to D, and D satisfies conditions 1 and 2 and if there is an 
S s !. and Be* E �with C(S, B:*) f S then
(PP) : 'v']: s �such that xPiy 'v'i EN, xD(]:) y.
Proof z s S - C(S, R*) =t> [3w s C(S, ]:*) if the solution property is 
satisfied or 3w s S if the core property is satisfied] such that 
wD(]:*) z. Now if R is such that xP .y 'v' i E N; define R** so that- i -
wP. **z and xP. **y 'v' i s N. Then wD(R**) z: by monotonicity and xD(R**) yi i - -
by neutrality. Finally xD(]:) y by monotonicity. 
Q.E.D. 
A theorem of Brown's [1975] indicates that games;with 
d-�noe «roctum which '""''Y che above axio= =" +�-lly 
oligarchical in a certain sense. A coalition, V, is called dkcisi, 
just in case for any Rs 0 and x, y s X such that xP.y for 111- - i 
i E V, xD(]:) y. Brown showed that if D : � + 0 is acyclic 
valued, satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, l abld th 
Binary Pareto Principle then there is some individual who is' 
every decisive set. 
A straightforward application of Brown's 
theorem 1 establishes the following result. 
Theorem 2 If C : B ® 0 + X satisfies conditions 1 and 2 andl the 
solution property r�lat�ve �o the Dominance structure, D, lndlif g 
contains the finite subsets of X, then either 
i) there is some individual who is in every decisi�e se 
or 
ii) I xi is even with minimal cycle size for D equal: Ito 
This result constitutes an answer to the problemlo 
"revealed" institutions posed by Plott [ 1974]: if a social 
function which is neutral and monotone is known to be geneta 
oic 
ed a 
the solution of some underlying cooperative game, what canl be sai
about the structure of this cooperative game? Theorem 2 ind�cate 
that we can conclude in this case that if the set of envirbnments 
over which the social choice function operates is sufficielt:�y 
diverse then the game structure must be oligarchic in a celr:ain 
8 
sense. And, in fact, we can identify exactly those individuals who 
are in every decisive coalition. 
19 
As a final example note that among the neutral and monotone 
social decision procedures are the special majority rules discussed 
in Ferejohn and Grether [1974]. A social choice function might be 
called an S-extended special majority rule if on the two element 
sets it is a special majority rule, while on the larger sets it 
chooses solutions with respect to some dominance structure. It's 
easy to see that in this case the dominance structure must agree 
with the special majority rule on the two element sets. And, if 
lxl = m is even, we can employ Theorem 1 of Ferejohn and Grether
along with Theorem 2 of this paper to conclude that the special 
majority must contain at least n m
-l individuals. If lxl is oddm 
or infinite, then the only special majority rule that satisfies 
the condition of Theorem 2 is the unanimity rule (which is of course 
oligarchic by our definition) .  
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